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Abstract — Cloud computing is a new computational paradigm 
that offers an innovative business model for organizations to 
adopt IT without upfront investment. Despite the potential 
gains achieved from the cloud computing, the model security is 
still questionable which impacts the cloud model adoption. 
The security problem becomes more complicated under the 
cloud model as new dimensions have entered into the problem 
scope related to the model architecture, multi-tenancy, 
elasticity, and layers dependency stack. In this paper we 
introduce a detailed analysis of the cloud security problem. 
We investigated the problem from the cloud architecture 
perspective, the cloud offered characteristics perspective, the 
cloud stakeholders’ perspective, and the cloud service delivery 
models perspective. Based on this analysis we derive a detailed 
specification of the cloud security problem and key features 
that should be covered by any proposed security solution.  
Keywords: cloud computing; cloud computing security; cloud 
computing security management. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Cloud computing provides the next generation of 
internet-based, highly scalable distributed computing 
systems in which computational resources are offered 'as a 
service'. The most widely used definition of the cloud 
computing model is introduced by NIST [1] as “a model for 
enabling convenient, on-demand network access to a 
shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., 
networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that 
can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal 
management effort or service provider interaction.”.  Multi-
tenancy and elasticity are two key characteristics of the 
cloud model. Multi-Tenancy enables sharing the same 
service instance among different tenants. Elasticity enables 
scaling up and down resources allocated to a service based 
on the current service demands. Both characteristics focus 
on improving resource utilization, cost and service 
availability.  
The cloud model has motivated industry and academia to 
adopt cloud computing to host a wide spectrum of 
applications ranging from high computationally intensive 
applications down to light weight services. The model is 
also well-suited for small and medium businesses because it 
helps  adopting IT without upfront investments in 
infrastructure, software licenses and other relevant 
requirements. Moreover, Governments become more 
interested in the possibilities of using cloud computing to 
reduce IT costs and increase capabilities and reachability of 
their delivered services.  
According to a Gartner survey [2] on cloud computing 
revenues, the cloud market  was worth USD 58.6B in 2009 
,  is expected to be USD 68B in 2010 and will reach USD 
148B by 2014. These revenues imply that cloud computing 
is a promising platform. On the other hand, it increases the 
attackers’ interest in finding existing vulnerabilities in the 
model. 
Despite the potential benefits and revenues that could be 
gained from the cloud computing model, the model still has 
a lot of open issues that impact the model creditability and 
pervasiveness. Vendor lock-in, multi-tenancy and isolation, 
data management, service portability, elasticity engines, 
SLA management, and cloud security are well known open 
research problems in the cloud computing model.  
From the cloud consumers’ perspective, security is the 
major concern that hampers the adoption of the cloud 
computing model [3] because:  
• Enterprises outsource security management to a third 
party that hosts their IT assets (loss of control).  
• Co-existence of assets of different tenants in the same 
location and using the same instance of the service 
while being unaware of the strength of security controls 
used. 
• The lack of security guarantees in the SLAs between the 
cloud consumers and the cloud providers. 
• Hosting this set of valuable assets on publicly available 
infrastructure increases the probability of attacks. 
From the cloud providers’ perspective, security requires a 
lot of expenditures (security solutions’ licenses), resources 
(security is a resource consuming task), and is a difficult  
problem to master (as we discuss later). But skipping 
security from the cloud computing model roadmap will 
violate the expected revenues as explained above. So cloud 
providers have to understand consumers’ concerns and seek 
out new security solutions that resolve such concerns.  
In this paper we analyze existing challenges and issues 
involved in the cloud computing security problem. We 
group these issues into architecture-related issues, service 
delivery model-related issues, cloud characteristic-related 
issues, and cloud stakeholder-related issues. Our objective 
is to identify the weak points in the cloud model. We 
present a detailed analysis for each weakness to  highlight 
their root causes. This will help cloud providers and 
security vendors to have a better understanding of the 
problem. It also helps researchers being aware of the 
existing problem dimensions and gaps. 
Our paper is organized as follows. In section II, we explore 
previous efforts in defining cloud security problems and 
challenges. Sections III to VII explore the cloud computing 
security problem from different perspectives. Section VIII 
discusses the key security enablers in the cloud model. 
Section IX summarizes our conclusions and what we 
believe are the key dimensions that should be covered by 
any cloud security solution. Finally, in section X we discuss 
the future work focusing on one of the discussed security 
enablers (cloud security management). 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Cloud computing security challenges and issues discussed 
by various researchers. The Cloud Computing Use Cases 
group [4]  discusses the different use case scenarios and 
related requirements that may exist in the cloud computing 
model. They consider use cases from different perspectives 
including customers, developers and security engineers. 
ENISA [5] investigated the different security risks related 
to adopting cloud computing along with the affected assets, 
the risks likelihood, impacts, and vulnerabilities in cloud 
computing  that may lead to such risks. Similar efforts 
discussed in “Top Threats to Cloud Computing” by CSA 
[6]. Balachandra et al [7] discuss the security SLA’s 
specifications and objectives related to data locations, 
segregation and data recovery. Kresimir et al [8] discuss 
high level security concerns in the cloud computing model 
such as data integrity, payment, and privacy of sensitive 
information. Kresimir discussed different security 
management standards such as ITIL, ISO/IEC 27001 and 
Open Virtualization Format (OVF). Meiko et al [9] discuss 
the technical security issues arising from adopting the cloud 
computing model such as XML-attacks, Browsers’ related 
attacks, and flooding attacks. Bernd et al [10] discuss the 
security vulnerabilities existing in the cloud platform. The 
authors grouped the possible vulnerabilities into 
technology-related, cloud characteristics -related, security 
controls- related.  Subashini et al [11] discuss the security 
challenges of the cloud service delivery model, focusing on 
the SaaS model. CSA [6] discusses critical areas of  cloud 
computing. They deliver a set of best practices for the cloud 
provider, consumers and security vendors to follow in each 
domain. CSA published a set of detailed reports discussing 
for some of these domains. 
In our research we did a deep investigation in the cloud 
model to identify the root causes and key participating 
dimensions in such security issues/problems discussed by 
the previous work. This will help better to understand the 
problem and deliver solutions. 
 
III. THE CLOUD COMPUTING ARCHITECTURE AND 
SECURITY IMPLICATIONS 
The Cloud Computing model has three service delivery 
models and main three deployment models [1]. The 
deployment models are: (1) Private cloud: a cloud 
platform is dedicated for specific organization, (2) Public 
cloud: a cloud platform available to public users to register 
and use the available infrastructure, and (3) Hybrid cloud: 
a private cloud that can extend to use resources in public 
clouds. Public clouds are the most vulnerable deployment 
model because they are available for public users to host 
their services who may be malicious users. 
The cloud service delivery models, as in figure1, include: 
- Infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS): where cloud 
providers deliver computation resources, storage and 
network as an internet-based services. This service model 
is based on the virtualization technology. Amazon EC2 is 
the most familiar IaaS provider. 
- Platform-as-a-service (PaaS): where cloud providers 
deliver platforms, tools and other business services that 
enable customers to develop, deploy, and manage their 
own applications, without installing any of these 
platforms or support tools on their local machines. The 
PaaS model may be hosted on top of IaaS model or on top 
of the cloud infrastructures directly. Google Apps and 
Microsoft Windows Azure are the most known PaaS.  
 
- Software-as-a-service (SaaS): where cloud providers 
deliver applications hosted on the cloud infrastructure as 
internet-based service for end users, without requiring 
installing the applications on the customers’ computers. 
This model may be hosted on top of PaaS, IaaS or directly 
hosted on cloud infrastructure. SalesForce CRM is an 
example of the SaaS provider. 
 
 
Figure 1: cloud service delivery models  
 
Each service delivery model has different possible 
implementations, as in figure 1, which complicates the 
development of standard security model for each service 
delivery model. Moreover, these service delivery models 
may coexist in one cloud platform leading to further 
complication of the security management process. 
IV. CLOUD COMPUTING CHARACTERSTICS AND 
SECURITY IMPLICATIONS 
To achieve efficient utilization of resources, cloud 
providers need to increase their resource utilization while 
decreasing cost. At the same time consumers need to use 
resources as far as needed while being able to increase or 
decrease resources consumption based on actual demands. 
The cloud computing model meets such needs via a win-
win solution by delivering two key characteristics: multi-
tenancy and elasticity. Both characteristics turn out to have 
serious implications on the cloud model security.   
Multi-tenancy implies sharing of computational resources, 
storage, services, and applications with other tenants. 
Multi-tenancy has different realization approaches as 
shown in figure 2. In approach 1, each tenant has their own 
dedicated instance with their own customizations 
(customization may include special development to meet 
customer needs). In approach 2, each tenant uses a 
dedicated instance, like approach 1, while all instances are 
the same but with different configurations (adjustment of 
application parameters or interfaces). In approach 3, all 
tenants share the same instance with runtime configuration 
(the application is divided into core application component 
and extra components that are loaded based on the current 
tenant requests – similar to SalesForce.com). In approach 4 
tenants are directed to a load balancer that redirects tenants 
requests to a suitable instance based on current instances 
load. Approaches 3 and 4 are the most risky as tenants are 
coexisting on the same process in memory and hardware. 
This sharing of resources violates the confidentiality of 
tenants’ IT assets which leads to the need for secure multi-
tenancy. To deliver secure multi-tenancy there should be 
isolation among tenants’ data (at rest, processing and 
transition) and location transparency where tenants have 
no knowledge or control over the specific location of their 
resources (may have high level control on data location 
such as country or region level), to avoid planned attacks 
that attempt to co-locate with the victim assets [12]. In 
IaaS, isolation should consider VMs’ storage, processing, 
memory, cache memories, and networks. In PaaS, isolation 
should cover isolatation among running services and APIs’ 
calls. In SaaS, isolation should isolate among transactions 
carried out on the same instance by different tenants and 
tenants’ data. 
 
Figure 2: Multi-tenancy approaches [13] 
 
Elasticity implies being able to scale up or down resources 
assigned to services based on the current demand. Scaling 
up and down of tenant’s resources gives the opportunity to 
other tenants to use the tenant previously assigned 
resources. This may lead to confidentiality issues. For 
example, tenant A scaled down so it releases resources, 
these resources are now assigned to tenant B who in turn 
use it to deduce the previous contents of tenant A (similar 
to lag problem between DNS and DNS cache). Moreover, 
Elasticity includes a service placement engine that 
maintains a list of the available resources from the 
provider’s offered resources pool. This list is used to 
allocate resources to services. Such placement engines 
should incorporate cloud consumers’ security and legal 
requirements such as avoid placing competitors services on 
the same server, data location should be within the tenants’ 
country boundaries. Placement engines may include a 
migration strategy where services are migrated from 
physical host to another or from cloud to another in order to 
meet demands and efficient utilization of the resources. 
This migration strategy should take into account the same 
security constraints. Furthermore, security requirements 
defined by service consumers should be migrated with the 
service and initiates a process to enforce security 
requirements on the new environment, as defined by cloud 
consumers, and updates the current cloud security model. 
 
V. CLOUD COMPUTING’S DEEP DEPENDENNCIES STACK 
The cloud computing model depends on a deep stack of 
dependent layers of objects (VMs, APIs, Services and 
Applications) where the functionality and security of a 
higher layer depends on the lower ones. The IaaS model 
covers cloud physical infrastructure layer (storage, 
networks and servers), virtualization layer (hypervisors), 
and virtualized resources layer (VMs, virtual storage, 
virtual networks). The PaaS model covers the platform 
layers (such as application servers, web servers, IDEs, and 
other tools), and APIs and Services layers. The PaaS layer 
depends on the virtualization of resources as delivered by 
IaaS. The SaaS model covers applications and services 
offered as a service for end users, as shown in figure 3. The 
SaaS layer depends on a layer of platforms to host the 
services and a layer of virtualization to optimize resources 
utilization when delivering services to multi-tenant. 
 
Figure 3: Cloud computing model layers 
 
This deep dependency stack of cloud objects complicates 
the cloud security problem as the security of each 
object/layer depends on the security of the lower 
objects/layers. Furthermore, any breach to any cloud 
objects will impact the security of the whole cloud 
platform. Each cloud layer/object has a set of security 
requirements and vulnerabilities so it requires a set of 
security controls to deliver secured service. This results in a 
huge number of security controls that needs to be managed. 
Moreover, managing such heterogeneous security controls 
to meet security needs is a complex task, taking into 
account conflicts among the security requirements and 
among security controls at each layer. This may result in an 
inconsistent security model. Hence, a unified security 
control management module is required. This module 
should coordinate and integrate among the various layers’ 
security controls based on security needs. 
 
VI. CLOUD COMPUTING STAKEHOLDERS AND 
SECURITY IMPLICATIONS 
The cloud computing model has different involved 
stakeholders: cloud provider (an entity that delivers 
infrastructures to the cloud consumers), service provider 
(an entity that uses the cloud infrastructure to deliver 
applications/services to end users), and service consumer 
(an entity that uses services hosted on the cloud 
infrastructure). Each stakeholder has their own security 
management systems/processes and each one has their own 
expectations (requirements) and capabilities (delivered) 
from/to other stakeholders. This leads to: (1) A set of 
security requirements defined on a service by different 
tenants that may conflict with each other. So security 
configurations of each service should be maintained and 
enforced on the service instances level and at runtime 
taking into account the possibility of changing requirements 
based on current consumers’ needs to mitigate new risks; 
(2) Providers and consumers need to negotiate and agree on 
the applied security properties. However, no standard 
security specification notations are available that can be 
used by the cloud stakeholders to represent and reason 
about their offered/required security properties; and (3) 
Each stakeholder has their own security management 
processes used to define their assets, expected risks and 
their impacts, and how to mitigate such risks. Adopting 
cloud model results in losing control from both involved 
parties, including cloud providers (who are not aware of the 
contents and security requirements of services hosted on 
their infrastructures) and cloud consumers (who are not 
able to control neither on their assets security nor on other 
services sharing the same resources). Security SLA 
management frameworks represent part of the solution 
related to security properties specification, enforcement and 
monitoring. However, SLAs still don’t cover security 
attributes in their specifications [14]. Moreover, SLAs are 
high level contracts where the details of the security 
policies and security control and how to change at runtime 
are not included.  
On the other side, cloud providers are not able to deliver 
efficient and effective security controls because they are not 
aware of the hosted services’ architectures. Furthermore, 
cloud providers are faced with a lot of changes to security 
requirements while having a variety of security controls 
deployed that need to be updated. This further complicates 
the cloud providers’ security administrators’ tasks. 
Transparency of what security is enforced, what risks exist, 
and what breaches occur on the cloud platform and the 
hosted services must exist among cloud providers and 
consumers. This is what is called “trust but verify” [15], 
where cloud consumers should trust in their providers 
meanwhile cloud providers should deliver tools to help 
consumers to verify and monitor security enforcements.  
 
VII. CLOUD COMPUTING SERVICE DELIVERY 
MODELS AND SECURITY IMPLICATIONS 
We summarize the key security issues/vulnerabilities in 
each service delivery model. Some of these issues are the 
responsibility of cloud providers while others are the 
responsibility of cloud consumers. 
A. IaaS Issues 
VM security – securing the VM operating systems and 
workloads from common security threats that affect 
traditional physical servers, such as malware and viruses, 
using traditional or cloud-oriented security solutions. The 
VM’s security is the responsibility of cloud consumers. 
Each cloud consumer can use their own security controls 
based on their needs, expected risk level, and their own 
security management process. 
Securing VM images repository - unlike physical servers 
VMs are still under risk even when they are offline. VM 
images can be compromised by injecting malicious codes in 
the VM file or even stole the VM file itself. Secured VM 
images repository is the responsibilities of the cloud 
providers. Another issue related to VM templates is that 
such templates may retain the original owner information 
which may be used by a new consumer. 
Virtual network security - sharing of network infrastructure 
among different tenants within the same server (using 
vSwitch) or in the physical networks will increase the 
possibility to exploit vulnerabilities in DNS servers, DHCP, 
IP protocol vulnerabilities, or even the vSwitch software 
which result in network-based VM attacks. 
Securing VM boundaries - VMs have virtual boundaries 
compared with to physical server ones. VMs that co-exist 
on the same physical server share the same CPU, Memory, 
I/O, NIC, and others (i.e. there is no physical isolation 
among VM resources).  Securing VM boundaries is the 
responsibility of the cloud provider. 
Hypervisor security - a hypervisor is the “virtualizer” that 
maps from physical resources to virtualized resources and 
vice versa. It is the main controller of any access to the 
physical server resources by VMs. Any compromise of the 
hypervisor violates the security of the VMs because all 
VMs operations become traced unencrypted. Hypervisor 
security is the responsibility of cloud providers and the 
service provider. In this case, the SP is the company that 
delivers the hypervisor software such as VMware or Xen. 
B. PaaS Security Issues  
SOA related security issues – the PaaS model is based on 
the Service-oriented Architecture (SOA) model. This leads 
to inheriting all security issues that exist in the SOA 
domain such as DOS attacks, Man-in-the-middle attacks, 
XML-related attacks, Replay attacks, Dictionary attacks, 
Injection attacks and input validation related attacks [9, 16]. 
Mutual authentication, authorization and WS-Security 
standards are important to secure the cloud provided 
services. This security issue is a shared responsibility 
among cloud providers, service providers and consumers. 
API Security - PaaS may offer APIs that deliver 
management functions such as business functions, security 
functions, application management, etc. Such APIs should 
be provided with security controls and standards 
implemented, such as OAuth [17], to enforce consistent 
authentication and authorization on calls to such APIs. 
Moreover, there is a need for the isolation of APIs in 
memory. This issue is under the responsibility of the cloud 
service provider. 
C. SaaS Security Issues  
In the SaaS model enforcing and maintaining security is a 
shared responsibility among the cloud providers and service 
providers (software vendors). The SaaS model inherits the 
security issues discussed in the previous two models as it is 
built on top of both of them including data security 
management [11] (data locality, integrity, segregation, 
access, confidentiality, backups) and network security. 
Web application vulnerability scanning - web applications 
to be hosted on the cloud infrastructure should be validated 
and scanned for vulnerabilities using web application 
scanners [18]. Such scanners should be up to date with the 
recently discovered vulnerabilities and attack paths 
maintained in the National Vulnerability Database (NVD) 
and the Common Weaknesses Enumeration (CWE) [19]. 
Web application firewalls should be in place to mitigate 
existing/discovered vulnerabilities (examining HTTP 
requests and responses for applications specific 
vulnerabilities). The ten most critical web applications 
vulnerabilities in 2010 listed by OWASP [20] are injection, 
cross site scripting (Input validation) weaknesses. 
Web application security miss-configuration and breaking - 
web application security miss-configuration or weaknesses 
in application-specific security controls is an important 
issue in SaaS. Security miss-configuration is also very 
critical with multi-tenancy where each tenant has their own 
security configurations that may conflict with each other 
leading to security holes. It is mostly recommended to 
depend on cloud provider security controls to enforce and 
manage security in a consistent, dynamic and robust way. 
D. Cloud Management Security Issues 
The Cloud Management Layer (CML) is the “microkernel” 
that can be extended to incorporate and coordinate different 
components. The CML components include SLA 
management, service monitoring, billing, elasticity, IaaS, 
PaaS, SaaS services registry, and security management of 
the cloud. Such a layer is very critical since any 
vulnerability or any breach of this layer will result in an 
adversary having control, like an administrator, over the 
whole cloud platform. This layer offers a set of APIs and 
services to be used by client applications to integrate with 
the cloud platform. This means that the same security issues 
of the PaaS model apply to the CML layer as well. 
E. Cloud Access Methods Security Issues 
Cloud computing is based on exposing resources over the 
internet. These resources can be accessed through (1) web 
browsers (HTTP/HTTPS), in case of web applications - 
SaaS; (2) SOAP, REST and RPC Protocols, in case of web 
services and APIs – PaaS and CML APIs; (3) remote 
connections, VPN and FTP in case of VMs and storage 
services – IaaS. Security controls should target 
vulnerabilities related to these protocols to protect data 
transferred between the cloud platform and the consumers. 
 
VIII. CLOUD COMPUTING SECURITY ENABLERS 
A. Identity & Access Management (IAM) and Federation 
Identity is a core of any security aware system. It allows the 
users, services, servers, clouds, and any other entities to be 
recognized by systems and other parties. Identity consists of 
a set of information associated with a specific entity. This 
information is relevant based on context. Identity should 
not disclose user personal information “privacy”. Cloud 
platforms should deliver or support a robust and consistent 
Identity management system. This system should cover all 
cloud objects and cloud users with corresponding identity 
context information. It should include: Identity 
Provisioning and de-provisioning, identity information 
privacy, identity linking, identity mapping, identity 
federation, identity attributes federation, single sign on, 
authentication and authorization. Such system should adopt 
existing standards, such as SPML, SAML, OAuth, and 
XACML, to securely federate identities among interacting 
entities within different domains and cloud platforms.  
B. Key Management 
Confidentiality is one of key objectives of the cloud 
computing security (CIA triad). Encryption is the main 
solution to the confidentiality objective, for data, processes 
and communications. Encryption algorithms either 
symmetric key-based or asymmetric are key-based. Both 
encryption approaches have a major problem related to 
encryption key management i.e. how to securely generate, 
store, access and exchange secrete keys. Moreover, PaaS 
requires application keys for all APIs and service calls from 
other applications. The applications’ keys must be 
maintained securely along with all other credentials 
required by the application to be able to access such APIs. 
C. Security Management  
Based on the huge number of cloud stakeholders, the deep 
dependency stack, and the large number of security controls 
to deliver security requirements, the cloud security 
management becomes a more complicated research 
problem. Security management needs to include security 
requirements and policies specifications, security controls 
configurations according to the policies specified, and 
feedback from the environment and security controls to the 
security management and the cloud stakeholders. Security 
management should function as a plug-in for CML. 
D. Secure Software Development Lifecycle  
The secure software development lifecycle (SDLC with 
security engineering activities) includes elicitation of the 
security requirements, threat modeling, augmentation of 
security requirements to the systems models and the 
generated code consequently. The cloud based applications 
will involve revolution in the lifecycles and tools used to 
build secure systems. The PaaS provides a set of reusable 
security enabling components to help developing secured 
cloud-based applications. Also security engineering of the 
cloud-based application should change to meet new security 
requirements imposed on such systems. Applications 
should support adaptive security (avoiding hardcoded 
security) to be able to meet vast range of consumers’ 
security requirements. Adaptive application security is 
based on externalizing/delegating the security enforcement 
and applications security management to the cloud security 
management, cloud security services and security controls.  
E. Security-Performance tradeoff optimization 
The cloud computing model is based on delivering services 
using SLAs. SLAs should cover objectives related to 
performance, reliability, and security. SLAs also define 
penalties that will be applied in case of SLA violation. 
Delivering high security level, as one of SLA objectives, 
means consuming much more resources that impact on the 
performance objective (the more adopted security tools and 
mechanism, the worst the impact on the performance of the 
underlying services). Cloud management should consider 
the trade-off between security and performance using utility 
functions for security and performance (least security 
unless stated otherwise). Moreover, we should focus on 
delivering adaptive security where security controls 
configurations are based on the current and expected threat 
level and considering other tradeoffs. 
F. Federation of security among multi-clouds 
When a consumer uses applications that depend on services 
from different clouds, he will need to maintain his security 
requirements enforced on both clouds and in between. The 
same case when multiple clouds integrate together to 
deliver a bigger pool of resources or integrated services, 
their security requirements needs to be federated and 
enforced on different involved cloud platforms.  
 
IX. CONCLUSION 
The cloud computing model is one of the promising 
computing models for service providers, cloud providers 
and cloud consumers. But to best utilize the model we need 
to block the existing security holes. Based on the details 
explained above, we can summarize the cloud security 
problem as follows: 
• Some of the security problems are inherited from the 
used technologies such as virtualization and SOA. 
• Multi-tenancy and isolation is a major dimension in the 
cloud security problem that requires a vertical solution 
from the SaaS layer down to physical infrastructure (to 
develop physical alike boundaries among tenants 
instead of virtual boundaries currently applied). 
• Security management is very critical to control and 
manage this number of requirements and controls.  
• The cloud model should have a holistic security 
wrapper, as shown in figure 3, such that any access to 
any object of the cloud platform should pass through 
security components first. 
Based on this discussion we recommend that cloud 
computing security solutions should: 
• Focus on the problem abstraction, using model-based 
approaches to capture different security views and link 
such views in a holistic cloud security model. 
• Inherent in the cloud architecture. Where delivered 
mechanisms (such as elasticity engines) and APIs 
should provide flexible security interfaces.  
• Support for: multi-tenancy where each user can see only 
his security configurations, elasticity, to scale up and 
down based on the current context. 
• Support integration and coordination with other security 
controls at different layers to deliver integrated security. 
• Be adaptive to meet continuous environment changes 
and stakeholders needs. 
 
X.    FUTURE WORK 
 
We are investigating in the cloud security management 
problem. Our objective is to block the hole arise in the 
security management processes of the cloud consumers and 
the cloud providers from adopting the cloud model. To be 
able to resolve such problem we need to: (1) Capture 
different stakeholders security requirements from different 
perspectives and different levels of details; (2) Map security 
requirements to the cloud architecture, security patterns and 
security enforcement mechanisms; and (3) Deliver 
feedback about the current security status to the cloud 
providers and consumers. We propose to adopt an adaptive 
model-based approach in tackling the cloud security 
management problem. Models will help in the problem 
abstraction and the capturing of security requirements of 
different stakeholders at different levels of details. 
Adaptive-ness will help in delivering an integrated, 
dynamic and enforceable cloud security model. The 
feedback loop will measure the security status to help 
improving the current cloud security model and keeping 
cloud consumers aware with their assets’ security status 
(applying the trust but verify concept). 
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